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Structuring Criminal Codes to Perform
Their Function
Paul H. Robinson*
Almost exactly three years ago, I stood here giving a
paper for a conference on federal criminal code reform
sponsored by the Center. My goal was to provide a "top
ten" list of needed reforms.1 My approach was to suggest
five lessons that the federal criminal code could learn from
the Model Penal Code and five lessons that both codes
could learn.2
It seemed useful at the time, but now it
leaves me as having already said-in this very location
most of what I wanted to say about what is good and bad
about the Model Penal Code. But there was one of those
items, the tenth, that I could only mention in barest
outline. So I'm pleased to have the opportunity today to lay
out in greater detail what I could not say back then about
the item at the top of my "top ten" list.
How should a criminal code be structured to best
A criminal code of today must
perform its functions?
perform two very different functions:
(1) It must perform the ex ante function of announcing
the rules of conduct that are to govern the conduct of all
persons within the code's jurisdiction; and
(2) it must perform the ex post function of establishing

*

Edna & Ednyfed Williams Professor of Law, Northwestern University.

1. See Paul H. Robinson, Reforming the Federal Criminal Code: A Top Ten
List, 1 Buff. Crim. L. Rev. 225 (1997).
2. Part l Characteristics of a "Modem Code": Lessons From the MPC: 1.
Create a Comprehensive General Part; 2. Provide an Analytic Structure; 3.
Define

Offenses Fully, Using Defined Terms; 4.

Interpretation of Code Provisions;

5.

Create a System for the

Adopt a System of Offenses.

Part Il Reforming the Model Penal Code: 6. Drafting Problems: Fix the
Revealed Drafting Errors of the M.P.C. (Examples: a. Failure to define the
distinction among conduct, circumstance, and result elements; b. Confusion in the
definition of causation requirements);

7.

The Disparity Problem: Use More

Offense Grading Categories; 8. The Rationality Problem: Define a Distributive
Principle;

9.

The Utility of Desert: Avoid Conflicts with the Community's

Perceptions of Desert; 10. A Functional Form: Segregate the Rules of Conduct and
the Principles of Adjudication into Distinct Codes.
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for the participants in the criminal justice process the
principles by which violations of the rules of conduct are to
be adjudicated.
These two functions often are in tension with one
another. Each calls for a different kind of code, addressed
to a different audience, with different objectives:

(1) To be effective ex ante, the rules of conduct must
be formulated in a way that they will be understood and
remembered, and which will make them capable of being
applied in daily life by lay persons with a wide range of
abilities

and

from

a

wide

variety

of

backgrounds.

Effectiveness in announcing the rules of conduct requires
simple, clear, and preferably objective rules.

(2)

In

contrast,

the

goal

of

the

principles

of

adjudication-to assess ex post the degree of liability and
punishment, if any, due for a violation of the rules of
conduct--often requires nuanced, subjective treatment,
sometimes at least as nuanced, subjective, and complex as
our

notions

of

justice

(or

as

complex

judgments,

the

demands of whatever punishment theory is relied upon).
One might be disheartened by this conflict between the
needs of a code's two functions, for it suggests a criminal
code condemned to a permanent state of compromise and
dysfunction.

To

serve

undermine the other.
attempt to strike a

one

interest,

the

code

must

All that a drafter can do is to
balance between the competing

dysfunctions.
But it turns out that no such compromise or balancing
is necessary, because, in fact, the doctrines that serve the
rules-of-conduct function are distinct from those that serve
the adjudication function. Thus, both functions can be
maximized by simply identifying and segregating the
doctrines that serve each, then drafting the doctrines in a
way that maximizes their respective functions.

Two CODES
What does this segregation of doctrines look like?
What doctrines make up the criminal law's rules of
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That is, what aspects of the criminal law are
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essential for a citizen to know if he or she is to know what
the law commands? What doctrines are not necessary to
know the law's commands and serve only to tell
adjudicators whether and how much liability and
punishment ought to be imposed for a violation of the rules
of conduct?
As you will see, answering these questions-making
the rules-of-conduct/adjudication distinction-requires us
to pull apart most of our current doctrines. Some aspects of
offense definitions serve one function, while other aspects
of offense definitions serve the other.

Some aspects of

defenses serve one function, while other aspects serve the
other. This intertwining of the two functions only
illustrates just how oblivious current law is to the
distinction between rules of conduct and principles of
adjudication.

I have published a full working out of this segregation
of criminal law doctrines. Those who are interested can
find it in Part III of my book, Structure and Function in
Criminal Law.3 Let me sketch a few of the basic points.

RULES OF CONDUCT
Focusing first on announcing the rules of conduct,
what doctrines are necessary to describe to citizens the
conduct

that the criminal law forbids, the conduct it
requires, and the conduct t hat it permits because of special
circumstances that otherwise would be forbidden?
Looking first at offense definitions, the definition of
forbidden conduct generally is found in the objective
conduct and circumstance elements of a code's offense
definitions. The culpability requirements of offense
definitions typically serve the adjudication function
telling us whether performance of the forbidden conduct on
this occasion ought to be punished and, if so, to what
3. Paul H.

Robinson, Structure and Function in Criminal Law (1997)

[hereinafter Robinson, Structure and Function].

In an earlier form, see Paul H.

Robinson, A Functional Analysis of Criminal Law, 88 Nw. U. L. Rev. 857 (1994).
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degree. (An important exception to this is the special kind
of intention requirement contained in inchoate offenses.)
In serving the adjudication function, the culpability
requirements are supplemented by the excuse defenses,
such as insanity, immaturity, involuntary intoxication, and
mistake as to a justification. The objective result elements
of offense definitions also serve the adjudication function,
by establishing the grade of an offense, with greater
punishment imposed where a forbidden result actually
comes about than where it does not. (Not everyone agrees
that this should be the rule, of course, but it is clearly the
majority rule in the United States.)
To illustrate these distinctions, the rules of conduct
forbid engaging in conduct that risks injuring another, that
is, conduct under certain circumstances (those that would
create a risk to another person). If a person engages in
such conduct despite the prohibition, the principles of
adjudication may hold the person liable if the conduct is
performed with a culpable state of mind. And culpable
conduct may be punished even more severely if the harm it
risked actually occurs.
The rules of conduct specify not only what conduct is
prohibited but also what is required. This aspect of the
rules of conduct is found in the objective requirements of
the law's duties to act. The principles for adjudicating
violations of these duties are contained, again, in the
culpability
requirements
for
these
duties
and
supplemented by the excuse defenses. They also include
the special capacity requirement attached to omission
liability.
To illustrate, the rule of conduct requires parents to
care for children. If parents fail in this duty, the principles
of adjudication examine whether their failure was
purposeful, knowing, reckless, or negligent, whether the
parents were capable of performing their duty, and
whether their failure nonetheless might be excused.
Finally, the rules of conduct, to be complete, must tell
citizens when they are permitted to engage in conduct that
otherwise is prohibited. This aspect of the rules of conduct
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is found in the objective requirements of justification
defenses. For example, the rules of conduct generally
prohibit engaging in conduct that risks harm to another,
yet the rules allow such conduct if it is necessary to defend
against an unjustified attack.
To summarize, the rules of conduct sought to be
announced ex ante to the community are contained, for the
most part, in the conduct and circumstance elements of
offense definitions, the law's positive duties to act, and the
(objective aspects of) justification defenses.
The principles of adjudication-telling participants in
the criminal justice process how to judge a violation of the
rules of conduct-are similarly dispersed throughout a
criminal code's provisions. They are found in the objective
result elements of offense definitions, most of the
culpability requirements of offense definitions and duty
provisions, and the excuse defenses.
The table at page six summarizes the discussion.4

MIXING RULES OF CONDUCT WITH PRINCIPLES OF
ADJUDICATION
This intertwining of rules of conduct and principles of
adjudication within a single doctrine creates at least four
distinct kinds of problems.
First, the overlay of principles of adjudication
essentially hides the rules of conduct. Those rules need to
be made readily available to the general public in a form
that is easy to understand and apply, not buried under a
mountain of complex adjudication provisions. If one pulled
the rules of conduct from under the adjudication provisions,
the total of all the rules would run only eight to ten pages,5
rather than the hundreds of pages of most criminal codes.
Consider the complexities of a code's homicide and
assault provisions, which typically go on for many pages.

4. Robinson, Structure and Function, supra note 3, at 139.

5.

See, e.g., id. app. at

211 (the

eight-page code of conduct).
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Rule Articulation
Function

Liability

Grading

Function

Function

Violation Doctrines

Culpability Doctrines

Primary Violations:

Result elements of offence
definitions

Conduct and circumstance
elements of offense definitions
Legal duty requirements for
omission liability; possession of
contraband prohibited in
possession offences

Docttines imputing culpability

Docttines imputing aggravated

requirements, such as doctrines of

culpablity, such as felony

voluntary intoxication and

murder

substituted mental elements

Secondary Violations:

Miscellaneous offence
mitigations and aggravations

Excuse Doctrines
Voluntariness requirement, in
commission offences

Traditionally thought of

D

=

actus reus

as:

D=

mens rea

ll!Jil

defences
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Ninety-five percent of those provisions are principles of
adjudication-defining minimum requirements for liability,
as well as making grading distinctions of aggravation and
mitigation. The rule of conduct is simple: Do not engage in
conduct that risks injury to another.
Presumably most people know of this legal prohibition
without having to rely upon the criminal code, but not
every prohibition and legal duty is so well known. Does the
criminal law prohibit lying to a traffic cop? Does it require
a person to return a lost wallet? Does it permit a person to
shoot a trespasser in one's garage? Frankly, I think we
have given up on expecting a criminal code to educate the
public. But this need not be so. A properly constructed
code could teach the criminal law's commands. Especially
in a system like ours, which generally rejects an excuse for
even a reasonable mistake of law, such public education is
a goal we have a moral obligation to pursue.
A second problem with mixing rules of conduct and
principles of adjudication is the conflicting drafting
approaches the two need: The rules of conduct do best when
they are simple. In order for the principles of adjudication
to do their job, they often must be complex. The failure to
appreciate this conflict between the two can lead to
improper drafting of one or the other.
Consider, for example, the complex rules of the self
defense in Model Penal Code section 3.04. It is nothing but
silly to think that a citizen really could know, let alone
remember and apply, such rules. I have studied them for
twenty years and, if I were attacked tonight, I doubt I could
apply them, no matter how careful I tried to be.
A code of conduct might be able to establish a few basic
ground rules, such as: One can defend only against an
unjustified attack. One can use only that force necessary
for defense One can use deadly force only to prevent
serious bodily injury or worse. More detailed rules might
be of value as non-binding guidelines for adjudicators,
which might help increase uniformity in the disposition of
similar cases, but to provide pages of detailed rules, as
many American codes do, is only to insure that even the
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most law-abiding citizen will get no guidance from the code.
A third problem with failing to distinguish between
rules of conduct and principles of adjudication is the errors
in

substantive

formulation

that

it

induces.

Let

me

illustrate with the formulation of justification defenses.
The most common American formulation is the subjective
formulation: A person is justified if he "believes" his
conduct

meets

the

statute's

objective

criteria

for

justification.
But giving

a justification defense when a person

"believes" he is justified subsumes the objective rule of
conduct within the principle-of-adjudication excuse for a
mistaken

justification.

The

objective

justification

requirements define how and when we want people to act
in the future; the mistaken-"belief'-in-justification defense
excuses a person who has violated the rule of conduct
because the person lacks culpability. By formulating
justification defenses subjectively, as "belief," the code fails
to provide a clear rule of conduct.

The code tells what

kinds of mistakes will be excused, but how are people to
know the rule of conduct?
Beyond this failure of the code to announce clearly the
rule of conduct, such subjective formulation also distorts
the substantive rules themselves. For example, we want to
allow people to resist the attacker who only mistakenly
believes he is justified, but we do not want to allow people
to resist the attacker who is actually, objectively justified.
How can we make this needed distinction in setting out the
rule of conduct if the code defines "justified" in subjective
terms?

That terminology makes it difficult, if not a

practical impossibility, to state accurately the rule of
conduct.

To allow defense against an "unjustified" attack,

what one would think was the most natural definition,
gives too narrow a defense, for the actor who only
mistakenly "believes" he satisfies the rules of conduct is
'�ustified" under the,. Model Penal Code, and therefore
lawfully could not be resisted.
The problem can be solved-the Model Penal Code
tries to solve part of it in what is probably its most
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convoluted and unworkable provision, in section 3.11(1)'s
incomprehensible definition of "unlawful force''6-but why
create such a problem in the first place? Define
justifications objectively, as their rule-of-conduct function
would suggest. That allows a simple rule of conduct: One
can resist only "unjustified" aggression.
Further, the Model Penal Code does not even attempt
to fix the other part of the problem it has created. Its
subjective approach improperly allows lawful resistance to
the

unknowingly

justified

aggressor.

Because

the

unknowingly justified actor does not ''believe" he is
justified, his conduct is necessarily "unjustified" (and
"unlawful" under 3.11(1)) and therefore can lawfully be
resisted. But clearly we do not want the terrorist to have a
right to stop the thief whose theft of a backpack containing
the terrorist's bomb would save the beach goers threatened
by it.7
Structure and Function gives a series of examples of
substantive law errors induced by failing to distinguish
rules of conduct and principles of adjudication.
A final problem with mixing the two kinds of doctrines

in a single code is that it makes impossible an effective
verdict system. Every acquittal under the current mixed
system

presents

a

dangerously

ambiguous

message.

Consider, for example, the Rodney King case in which a
video tape showed police officers using what seemed clearly
to be excessive force in arresting an African-American
motorist. Their acquittal of all charges in state court might

6. Section 3.11(1) defines "unlawful force" as:
[F]orce, including confinement, which is employed without the consent of
the person against whom it is directed and the employment of which
constitutes an offense or actionable tort or would constitute such an offense
or tort except for a defense (such as the absence of intent, negligence, or
mental capacity; duress; youth; or diplomatic status) not amounting to a
privilege to use force.

Assent constitutes consent, within the meaning of

this Section, whether or not it is otherwise legally effective, except assent
to the infliction of death or serious boldly harm.
Model Penal code§ 3.11(1) (Proposed Official Draft 1962).

7. See, e.g., Paul H.

Robinson,

The

Justification, 8 Crim. L.F. 387-409 (1997).

Bomb Thief

and the Theory of
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be interpreted to mean that what the officers did was not a
violation of the rules of conduct. It might be taken as
announcing a rule that other officers in the same situation
in the future would similarly be justified in using the force
these officers used. If people gave the verdicts that
interpretation, the acquittals could be disturbing. For
many Mrican-Americans in Los Angeles, such a message
was something to be angry about and to riot over.
On the other hand, one could interpret the acquittal
differently, as providing an excuse, upon the officer's
mistaken belief in justification, for conduct that was
admittedly a violation of the rules of conduct. In other
words, the acquittal might have been intended to convey
the message that what was done was wrong, and that other
officers in a similar situation in the future ought not use
the force that was used here, but that these officers were
not going to be held criminally liable for their error because
of the special circumstances of their violation-presumably
their claims relating to lack of adequate training,
ambiguity in existing police department policies, a
mistaken belief that the arrestee was more dangerous than
he really was, and the confusion and heat of the preceding
car chase.
Notice that these two possible interpretations of the
acquittals say exactly opposite things about the rule of
conduct for future cases.
Instead of educating and
reinforcing people's understanding of the criminal law's
commands, verdicts under the present mixed system create
ambiguity and confusion, even undermining previously
unambiguous rules of conduct.
A system that distinguishes rules of conduct from
principles of adjudication is equipped to provide
unambiguous verdicts. A system that distinguishes
between rule-of-conduct doctrines and principles-of
adjudication doctrines, like the mistaken justification
excuse in the Rodney King case, can help rather than hurt
people's understanding of the rules. Here is how it would
work: If no rule of conduct is violated, a "No Violation"
verdict would be returned. If a rule of conduct is violated,
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but the actor is to be excused, an "Excused Violation"
verdict would be used, which reinforces the rule against the
conduct, rather than undercutting it. But such a system is
not possible without an analogous alteration of the
underlying code.
To summarize, a system of two codes-a code of
conduct and a code of adjudication-could better announce
the rules of conduct, could allow each code to be drafted in
a way most effective for its purpose, could avoid the
substantive errors that combined codes tend to make, and
would support a verdict system that distinguishes "no
violations" from "excused violations," an important
distinction to make because the two verdicts say opposite
things about whether the conduct in this case violates the
rules of conduct and would be permitted by others in the
same situation in the future.
I do not advocate keeping the code of adjudication from
the open view of the public. Such attempts at "acoustic
separation" have in the past come back to haunt the
criminal justice system by undermining its credibility when
a hidden practice is ultimately discovered, as it always will
be in our free society.
I do advocate special efforts to
educate citizens about what the criminal law commands of
them, a task that becomes feasible with a short and clear
statement of the law's commands in a separate code of
conduct.

